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COMMENT
From Anidrews to Woodson and Beyond: The Development of the Intentional
Tort Exception to the Exclusive Remedy Provision-Rescuing
North Carolina Workers from Treacherous Waters
"Lord, don't let me die in this place. Don't take me away from my
children."
-Mary Bryant, Hamlet survivor
"Tragedies happen. The whole package looked knee-jerk in a way. Just to
use this tragedy to unbalance the employer-employee contractual relation-
ship-that was going too far. "
-Representative John Kerr III of Goldsboro
"There's no question that we need to build additional financial incentives
for employers to have safe workplaces."
-- Chris Scott, president of the state AFL-CIO
"Who knows exactly what substantial certainty means?"
-- Charlotte lawyer Seth Bernanke
On September 3, 1991, a fire at the Imperial Foods Products plant in
Hamlet, North Carolina, killed twenty-five workers, injured forty-nine
others, and caused millions of dollars in damage to the plant facilities.'
The fire was caused when a hydraulic fuel line ruptured near the plant's
deep-fat fryer.2 A flame used to heat the fryer ignited the fuel, starting
the blaze and filling the plant with heavy black smoke. Most of the
deaths and injuries were caused by smoke inhalation. It had been eleven
years since state safety and health officials had inspected the plant.4 In-
vestigations after the fire revealed that the plant lacked fixed fire suppres-
sion systems, such as automatic sprinklers, a fire evacuation program and
that most of the fire exits were blocked or locked from the outside, trap-
ping the workers inside the burning building.5 The North Carolina De-
1. Exits blocked, 25 die as blaze sweeps plant, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 4, 1991, at 1.
2. 21 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 387 (Sept. 4, 1991).
3. 21 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 1083 (Jan. 1, 1992).
4. 21 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1361 (Mar. 11, 1992); see also 22 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No.
6, at 191 (finding that North Carolina's job safety and health agency failed to inspect a hazardous
waste incinerator for ten ,years).
5. 21 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1361 (Mar. 11, 1992). A report by the city of Hamlet
Fire Department said that "the ignition scenario of this fire led to the rapid spread of products of
combustion throughout most of the building that immediately threatened the majority of its occu-
pants." Id.
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partment of Labor levied a civil fine of $808,150, the largest penalty
assessed in North Carolina, against Imperial Food Products based on
eighty-three citations, including fifty-four charges of willful violations.6
This tragedy placed renewed scrutiny on North Carolina's workplace
safety programs, the liability of employers, and the safety of workers in
an industrial environment that is becoming increasingly complex and
dangerous.
The U.S. Department of Labor ordered a complete re-evaluation of
North Carolina's safety and health programs and all safety and health
plans administered by individual states.7 The completed report indicated
that all state run programs had deficiencies, and that North Carolina's
workplace safety program had the most deficienciesO Eight days after
the Hamlet fire, the AFL-CIO petitioned the U.S. Labor Department to
withdraw approval of North Carolina's state program.9 On October 24,
1991, the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) formally announced that it was unilaterally assuming limited
concurrent jurisdiction over North Carolina's workplace safety pro-
gram.' ° OSHA suspended plans to assume complete control over the
6. 21 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 1083 (Jan. 1, 1992). Emmett J. Roe, owner of Imperial
Food Products Incorporated, Brad M. Roe, his son and director of plant operations and James Hair,
the plant manager were indicted on twenty-five counts of involuntary manslaughter for "willfully
and feloniously" causing the deaths of the workers trapped inside of the plant. Emmett Roe pled
guilty and received ten years on one count and nine years and eleven months on another. Twenty-
three other counts were consolidated, and Roe received a thirty year suspended sentence. The sen-
tence was the longest given a United States criminal case for job related deaths. A twenty-five year
sentence imposed in People v. O'Neil, 550 N.E.2d 1090 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (see note 222) was
overturned on appeal. The charges against Brad Roe and James Hair were dropped. 22 O.S.H. Rep.
(BNA) No. 16, at 561-62 (Sept. 16, 1992). This indictment represents only the second time that a
North Carolina employer has been charged with a criminal offense for a workplace death. Coinci-
dentally, the previous case involved the 1985 trenching death of a worker. The employer pleaded no
contest to one charge of involuntary manslaughter and was given a three-year suspended sentence.
21 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1361 (Mar. 11, 1992). One hundred and two plaintiffs in the
Hamlet litigation, represented by thirty-four law firms, have agreed to a sixteen point one million
dollar settlement. The recoveries ranged from one million dollars to eight hundred and seventy-five
dollars. Jay Reeves, Hamlet: The Story Behind the Settlement, N.C. LAW. WKLY., Jan. 18, 1993, at
1.
7. 21 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 616 (Oct. 30, 1991) North Carolina is one of twenty-
three states and U.S. territories that run its own job safety and health programs. The other states
and territories that administer their own safety plans and which were examined by the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) are: Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
21 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at 1207 (Feb. 5, 1992).
8. 21 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at 1207 (Feb. 5, 1992). OSHA identified seven problem
areas in the program: adopting standards; staffing; discrimination investigations; classification of
violations; reports and information; financial management; and compliance procedures and manage-
ment. 21 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 1553 (Apr. 29, 1992).
9. 21 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 428 (Sept. 18, 1991).
10. 21 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 615 (Oct. 30, 1991); 29 C.F.R. § 1952 (1991). The take
over marked the first time that the Labor Department acted unilaterally to assume control over the
existing programs of a state run plan. Federal OSHA assumed authority for Iowa's and Virginia's
2
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program on the grounds that the proposals made by the North Carolina
Labor Department demonstrated that satisfactory commitments had
been made toward improving safety programs. " The proposals made by
the North Carolina Labor Department were brought quickly to the Gen-
eral Assembly which enacted seven workplace safety bills.' 2
On August 14, 1991, with prophetic anticipation of the September 3
fire at Hamlet and the civil claims of Imperial Food Products employees,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina addressed the issue of worker
safety and employer liability in the case of Woodson v. Rowland.' 3 The
Supreme Court of North Carolina held that an employee sustaining inju-
ries in the course of and arising out of employment by conduct that the
employer knew was substantially certain to cause injury is entitled to
pursue both a civil remedy against the employer and a workers' compen-
sation claim. 14 This comment concerns the development of tort liability
outside of workers' compensation laws in spite of the exclusive remedy
doctrine and will assist attorneys by 1) summarizing North Carolina
programs but that was part of an agreement between state and federal officials. 21 O.S.H. Rep.
(BNA) No. 21, at 571 (Oct. 23, 1991).
11. 22 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 139 (June 24, 1992); 22 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 243-
44 (July 22, 1992).
12. The legislature enacted: House Bill [hereinafter H] 1386 which provided that state and local
government agencies could be fined by the State OSHA (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-148 (1991)); H 1388,
which required employers with experience rate modifiers of 1.5 or more to set up safety and health
programs to reduce or eliminate hazards and to prevent employee injuries and illnesses. The experi-
ence rate modifier is the rating by which the insurance industry determines workers' compensation
premiums. H 1388 also required employers with 11 or more employees and experience rate modifi-
ers of 1.5 or more to establish safety and health committees with both employee and employer
representatives (N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-250 and 251 (1991)); H 1389 which required a state con-
struction site safety study, the designation of safety officers and representation by minorities and
women on the state building commission (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-135.26 (1991)); H 1390 which
required each state agency to establish a written safety program for its workplaces (N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 143-580 to -583 (1991)); H 1391 required that the Labor Department begin a special emphasis
inspection program for employers with a high frequency of violations or high risk workplaces (N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 95-136.1 (1991)); H 1392 requiring that state law meet federal standards by requiring
employers to report annually on fatalities and serious injuries. (N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-143, 97-81,
58-36-16 and 58-2-230 (1991)); H 1394 which protects whistle blowers from retaliatory discrimina-
tion by providing employees who have been discriminated against (discharged, suspended, demoted)
with the right to file a civil action and collect treble damages when the employer acts was willfully.
(N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-240 to -244, 95-130, 95-25.20, 74-24.15 and 126-86 (1991)). Proposed but
not enacted were the following: H 952 entitled An act to establish a commission to study the effect of
the exclusion of agriculture from workers' compensation coverage was postponed indefinitely (H.R.
952, 140th Leg., 1991 Session); H 1384 which would have appropriated over four million dollars for
the employment of eighty safety and health inspectors was postponed indefinitely (H.R. 1384, 140th
Leg., 1991 Session); H 1385 which would have created a special safety and health fund generated by
a tax on insurance premiums for use by state agencies with their safety and health responsibilities
was postponed indefinitely (H.R. 1385, 140th Leg., 1991 Session); H 1387, entitled "An act to repeal
the statute of repose for the collection of death benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act and
to allow an action against an employer for removal of machinery guards that results in injury to the
employee," was referred to the committee on courts (H.R. 1387, 140th Leg., 1991 Session).
13. 407 S.E.2d 222 (N.C. 1991).
14. Id. at 226.
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workers' compensation law; 2) providing a detailed analysis of the exclu-
sive remedy doctrine, culminating in the Woodson decision and its recent
progeny; and 3) defining substantial certainty in the context of workers'
compensation law so that practitioners can recognize a Woodson claim
and properly plead it. This comment will assist legislators, who may be
called on to codify Woodson, by providing a survey of the law in jurisdic-
tions which have legislatively addressed intentional employer miscon-
duct. Although this comment offers a critical analysis of the Woodson
opinion, this author supports the holding because it provides greater in-
centives for workplace safety. To accomplish this goal, this writer sug-
gests that the North Carolina General Assembly should make employers
liable in tort for their reckless conduct.
I. HISTORY
By the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the basis
for the economy of the United States had moved from agriculture to in-
dustrial production with a concomitant increase in injuries to workers
who were working in factories, mills, and mines."5 Most negligence ac-
tions filed by injured workers against their employers were unsuccessful
because the employers had available to them the traditional common law
defenses of the fellow servant rule, assumption of the risk, and contribu-
tory negligence.' 6 According to the doctrine of respondeat superior, em-
ployers are liable for the torts committed by their employees who are
acting within the scope of their employment.' 7 This theory provided a
basis of liability for the injured worker, but the "unholy trinity" of the
fellow servant rule, assumption of the risk, and contributory negligence
made recovery by the worker difficult if not impossible.' 8 The fellow
servant rule foreclosed the imposition of liability on an employer for inju-
ries caused to an employee by a co-employee.' 9 The defense of assump-
tion of the risk barred from recovery injured employees who voluntarily
continued to work with knowledge of a danger relating to their job.2"
The defense of contributory negligence barred a plaintiff from recovery if
15. E.g., DONALD T. DECARLO, & MARTIN MINKOWITZ, WORKERS COMPENSATION INSUR-
ANCE AND LAW PRACTICE: THE NEXT GENERATION 1-6 (1989).
16. Id. at 1-2.
17. Snow v. DeButts, 193 S.E. 224, 226 (N.C. 1937). This doctrine had its origin in Jones v.
Hart [Nisi prius 1698] K.B. 642, 2 Salk. 441. 1 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 4.20, at 24-25 (1992).
18. SAMUEL B. HOROVITZ, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS
2 (1944).
19. 1 LARSON, supra note 17, § 4.30, at 25. The origin of this exception can be traced to
Priestly v. Fowler, [1837] 3 M. & W. 1, 150 Reprint 1030. Id.
20. See generally 56 C.J.S. Master and Servant §§ 357, 358 (1948).
1992]
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his own negligence was a legal cause of the injuries.2" These defenses not
only presented the injured employee with sizable legal obstructions, but
the employee inevitably engendered the employer's ill will, making settle-
ment and future employment unlikely.22 Moreover, the injured worker
was forced to bear the losses during the lengthy pendency of the civil
suit. As a result, many injured and disabled employees remained without
an adequate remedy and became wards of the state.23
Germany responded to this problem by adopting the first modem com-
pensation system in 1884.24 The German plan was divided into three
parts: 1) the Sickness Fund, with workers contributing two-thirds and
employers one-third; 2) the Accident Fund, with contributions by em-
ployers only; and 3) Disability Insurance, with workers and employers
contributing one-half each.25 In 1909, the New York legislature ap-
pointed a commission to study the law of employer liability in industrial
accidents.26 In 1910, the legislature enacted a workers' compensation
statute without employee contributions, that imposed liability on em-
ployers for workplace injuries regardless of fault.27 The statute applied
only to hazardous employments, but was intended to be amended to in-
clude other industries in later years. 28 The coverage of the statute was
not expanded because the New York Court of Appeals held that no fault
liability was "unknown tothe common law and.., plainly constitute[d]
a deprivation of liberty and property under the federal and state Consti-
tutions unless its imposition [could] be justified under the police
power."'29 The court found that because the law did not "preserve public
health, morals, safety, or welfare of the employees," the police power of
the state could not justify the law.3"
Just one day after the court's decision, a disastrous factory fire killed
21. CHARLES E. DAYE & MARK W. MORRIS, NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS § 19.21.1
(1991).
22. See HOROVITZ, supra note 18, at 1-4.
23. DECARLO & MINKOWITZ, supra note 15, at 2.
24. 1 LARSON, supra note 17, § 5.10, at 33. Professor Larson traces the origin of workers'
compensation to the laws of Henry I, circa 1100, based on the following passage:
And in some cases a man cannot legitimately swear that another was not, through himself,
further from life and nearer to death; among which cases are these: If anyone, on the mission of
another, is the cause of death in the course of the errand; if anyone sends for someone, and the
latter is killed in coming; if anyone meets death having been called by another.
Id. § 4.10, at 23.
25. Id. § 5.10, at 35.
26. Id. § 5.20, at 37.
27. Id. § 5.20, at 38. The New York commission studied the German program but did not
recommend employee contributions for fear that it would be unconstitutional. Id. § 5.10, at 36.
28. DECARLO & MINKOWITZ, supra note 15, at 2-3.
29. Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431, 439 (N.Y. 1911).
30. Id. at 444.
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one hundred and forty-five workers.3 A new workers' compensation
statute followed in 1913 and in Jensen v. Southern Pacific Co.,32 the court
found that the public welfare was preserved by a "compulsory scheme of
insurance to secure injured workmen in hazardous employments and
their dependents from becoming objects of charity. '3 3 At the federal
level, the constitutionality of mandatory, no-fault based workers' com-
pensation was upheld two years later.34
The North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act was enacted on May
1, 1929.3' The social policy that supports all workers' compensation
laws, including the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, is that
injured workers, or their families in the case of death, should be provided
with swift and certain compensation.3 6 Workers were assured such a re-
sult by no longer having to prove that the employer was negligent. The
defenses of the fellow servant rule, assumption of the risk and contribu-
tory negligence were effectively eliminated. In exchange for the loss of
common law defenses, employers received limited and determinate liabil-
ity.37 Liability under workers' compensation laws was based upon the
occurrence of an accident arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment.3 I Tort liability was replaced with no-fault liability. a Since the
employer no longer had available the common law defenses to a negli-
gence claim and faced liability irrespective of fault, the employee was
forced to give up his right to pursue a common law action, thus shielding
the employer from unlimited and unpredictable liability.' Conse-
quently, employees surrendered their right to recover for pain and suffer-
ing4 and to a trial by jury.4 2 These trade-offs are the essence of the
statutory compromise, the quid pro quo, which grounds workers' com-
pensation law. The primary purpose of the North Carolina Workers'
31. DECARLO & MINKOWITZ, supra note 15, at 3. Most of the 145 people who died jumped to
their deaths. The employer paid each of the families that sued him seventy-five dollars. Id. at 3- 4.
32. 109 N.E. 600 (N.Y. App. Div. 1915).
33. Id. at 603.
34. New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
35. The North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, ch. 120, 1929 N.C. Sess. Laws 117
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to 97-101 (1991)).
36. Cabe v. Parker Graham Sexton, Inc., 162 S.E. 223, 229 (N.C. 1932).
37. DECARLO & MINKOWITZ, supra note 15, at 5. Some defenses were still preserved. An
injured worker is not entitled to receive workers' compensation benefits if the injury or death to the
employee was proximately caused by his intoxication or his willful intent to injure himself or an-
other. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1991).
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(6) (1991); Conrad v. Cook Lewis Foundry Co., 153 S.E. 266 (N.C.
1930).
39. Andrews v. Peters, 284 S.E.2d 748, 749 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981), affid, 347 S.E.2d 409 (N.C.
1986).
40. The North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, ch. 120, secs. 10, 11, 1929 N.C. Sess.
Laws 117 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-9 and -10.1 (1991)).
41. Jackson v. Fayetteville Area Sys. of Transp., 337 S.E.2d 110 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
42. Heavner v. Town of Lincolnton, 162 S.E. 909 (N.C. 1932).
1992]
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Compensation Act was "to compel industry to take care of its own
wreckage" 43 so that "[tlhe cost of an industrial accident [could] be
treated as a cost of production [eventually passed on to the consumer],
just as the wear and tear of the machinery has always been treated as a
cost."'  The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the Workmen's
Compensation Act was "enacted by the General Assembly in the exercise
of its police power, and ... constitutional and valid in all respects."45
II. THE NORTH CAROLINA WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
The Industrial Commission, an agency of the Department of Com-
merce comprised of three commissioners who are appointed by the Gov-
ernor,46 has exclusive jurisdiction over the rights and remedies provided
by the Act. 47 Jurisdiction is based on the finding of an employer-em-
ployee relationship at the time of the injury48 and a finding that the em-
ployer regularly employed three or more employees.49
In order to recover compensation under the Act, an injured employee
must prove that (s)he suffered an injury by accident arising out of and in
the course of employment.5" An accident is "an unlooked for and unto-
ward event" and "[a] result produced by a fortuitous cause."5" An acci-
dent results from the interruption of the employee's work routine by
unusual conditions likely to cause unexpected consequences. 52 An in-
jury, no matter how great, occurring under normal working conditions
and involving the employee's regular duties is not an accident.53 The
43. Barber v. Minges, 25 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1943).
44. LEONARD T. JERNIGAN, JR., NORTH CAROLINA WORKERS' COMPENSATION-LAW AND
PRACTICE § 1-2 (1988).
45. Lee v. American Enka Corp., 193 S.E. 809, 812 (N.C. 1937).
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-77 (1991).
47. Hedgepeth v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 182 S.E. 704 (N.C. 1935).
48. Askew v. Leonard Tire Co., 141 S.E.2d 280 (N.C. 1965).
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97(2)-i (1991).
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(6) (1991).
51. Edwards v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 41 S.E.2d 592, 593 (N.C. 1947).
52. Davis v. Raleigh Rental Center, 292 S.E.2d 763 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
53. Searsey v. Perry M. Alexander Construction Co., 239 S.E.2d 847 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978), rev.
denied, 244 S.E.2d 154 (1978) (The plaintiff suffered injury in an accident while he used an air
hammer because, although he regularly used the air hammer, he was injured while using it for an
unfamiliar purpose). In Davis, the plaintiff, a mechanic whose duties included helping customers
load rented equipment, did not suffer an injury by accident when he injured his back carrying a saw
rented by a customer. Davis, 292 S.E.2d at 766.
Back injury claims were typically unsuccessful because of plaintiffs' inability to establish injury by
accident until § 97-2(6) was amended in 1983 to address claims for back injuries. JERNIGAN, supra
note 44, at § 5-2. The statute provides:
where injury to the back arises out of and in the course of the employment and is the direct
result of a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned, "injury by accident" shall be con-
strued to include any disabling physical injury to the back arising out of and causally related to
such incident.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(6) (1991).
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definition of accident was extended to include a disablement or death
resulting from an occupational disease.5 4 An injury by accident arises
from a definite event, whereas an occupational disease develops gradually
over a period of time.55 There are twenty-eight types of occupational
diseases, from anthrax to asbestosis, that are covered by the Act.56
The phrase "arising out of employment" refers to the cause or origin
of the accident.57 In order to satisfy the "arising out of employment"
requirement, there must be a causal connection between the employment
and the injury and so long as the injury had its origin in the employment,
there is no requirement that the injury ought to have been foreseen.5 8
Any reasonable relationship between the employment and the injury is
sufficient to find that the injury arose out of the employment.59 Whether
an injury "arises out of the employment" is determined by an examina-
tion of the facts and circumstances surrounding each case.'
The phrase "in the course of employment" refers to the time, place,
and circumstances under which the accident occurred.6 The time of em-
ployment includes working hours as well as the time reasonably neces-
sary to go to and from the workplace, and the place of employment
includes the workplace of the employer.6 2 For example, injuries suffered
while commuting to and from work or during lunch hours are generally
not covered by the Act.63 The dual requirement that an injury "arise out
of" and "in the course of" employment does not involve two independent
tests; they are both part of a single test used to determine whether the
injury is connected with the employment."M Consequently, courts have
allowed a deficiency in one factor to be made up by the strength of the
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-52 and 97-53 (1991); Henry v. A.C. Lawrence Leather Co., 66
S.E.2d 693 (N.C. 1951).
55. Henry, 66 S.E.2d at 696.
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53 (1991).
57. Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co., 153 S.E. 266, 269 (1930).
58. Id.
59. Allred v. Allred-Gardner, Inc., 117 S.E.2d 476, 479 (N.C. 1960). In Gallimore v. Marilyn's
Shoes, 228 S.E.2d 39 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 233 S.E.2d 529 (N.C. 1977), the
court found that the murder of the plaintiff's daughter, occurring after she signed out from work but
while making a deposit for her employer, arose out of and in the course of her employment. In
Robbins v. Nicholson, 188 S.E.2d 350 (N.C. 1972), the court held that the murder of the plaintiff's
husband did not arise out of the employment because, although the murder occurred while the
plaintiff's husband was working and was motivated by the assailant's jealousy of his wife's working
relationship with the plaintiff's husband, the motive which inspired the murder was unrelated to the
employment.
60. Gallimore, 228 S.E.2d at 41.
61. Conrad, 153 S.E. at 269.
62. Gallimore, 228 S.E.2d at 42.
63. JERNIGAN, supra note 44, at §§ 6-3, 6-5.
64. Lee v. F.M. Henderson & Assocs., 200 S.E.2d 32, 36 (N.C. 1973). The aggravation of an
injury arising out of and in the course of employment, unless the result of an independent interven-
ing cause attributable to the claimant's intentional conduct, is compensable under the Act. Starr v.
Charlotte Paper Co., 175 S.E.2d 342 (N.C. Ct. App. 1970).
8
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other.65
In exchange for no longer having to prove negligence and a guarantee
of swift and certain compensation, employees relinquished their right to
pursue a common law action against their employer.66 This concession
by the employee is embodied in the exclusivity provisions which are
enunciated in sections 97-9 and 97-10.1 of the North Carolina General
Statutes. Section 97-9 provides:
Every employer subject to the compensation provisions of this Article
shall secure the payment of compensation to his employee in the manner
hereinafter provided; and while such security remains in force, he or
those conducting his business shall only be liable to any employee for
personal injury or death by accident to the extent and manner herein
specified.67
Section 97-10.1 provides:
If the employee and the employer are subject to and have complied with
the provisions of this Article, then the rights and remedies herein granted
to the employee, his dependents, next of kin, or personal representative
shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee, his depen-
dents, next of kin, or representative as against the employer at common
law or otherwise on account of such injury or death. 6s
The remedies provided under the Act are the only remedies available
to an injured worker or his dependents so long as the injury meets the
requirements of the Act. 69 The Act does not take away the right of em-
ployees to bring a civil action against the employer if the injury is discon-
nected with the employment and the employee is injured not as an
employee but as a member of the public.70
A distinction must be drawn between an injury which does not come
within the provisions of the Act, and an injury which is covered but not
compensable under the Act.7' In order for an injured worker to be com-
pensated under the Act, (s)he must prove that the injury resulted in a
disability. 72 Disability is defined as "incapacity because of injury to earn
65. E.g., Hoyle v. Isenhour Brick and Tile Co., 293 S.E.2d 196, 199 (N.C. 1982).
66. For a discussion of the historical development of workers' compensation law, see supra
notes 15-45 and accompanying text.
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-9 (1991) (emphasis added).
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (1991).
69. For a complete discussion of the requirements for compensation under the Act, see gener-
ally JERNIGAN, supra note 44.
70. Bryant v. Dougherty, 148 S.E.2d 548 (N.C. 1966) (The plaintiff was permitted to pursue a
common law action against the defendant doctor who was found to be an independent contractor
because, although the plaintiff was injured on the job and was referred to him by her employer, he
was not employed by the plaintiff's employer full time.) See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-26 (1991)
(providing that the malpractice of a physician furnished by the employer is deemed part of the injury
resulting from the accident). See infra note 192 for explanation of the dual capacity doctrine.
71. 2A LARSON, supra note 17, § 65.40, at 12-41.
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(9) (1991); Hollman v. City of Raleigh, 159 S.E.2d 874 (N.C.
1968).
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the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the
same or any other employment."73 Some injuries, although within the
Act, are not compensable because disability is defined in terms of the
ability to earn wages and not by mere physical infirmity. For example,
the loss of the sense of taste or smell as a result of a work-related injury is
not compensable under the Act because such an injury does not result in
the inability to earn the same wages the employee was previously earn-
ing.74 Moreover, the Act remains the exclusive remedy, although it pro-
vides no compensation for this element of damages.
III. THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY DOCTRINE
A. Background
The exclusive remedy doctrine protects "every employer.., and...
those conducting his business"75 from common law liability so long as
the injury was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of
the worker's employment.76 The phrase "those conducting his business"
includes fellow employees acting within the course of employment.77 Co-
employees are therefore also excluded from common law liability for neg-
ligence. 78  By extending the employer's immunity to co-employees,
North Carolina has accepted the premise that by merely working, an
employee increases the risk of negligently injuring himself and his co-
employees and has made a policy decision, that such injuries should be
treated as a cost of production.79 The Industrial Commission, therefore,
has exclusive jurisdiction over all accidental injuries arising out of em-
ployment. The exclusivity provision is not absolute but "must be con-
strued within the framework of the Act and as qualified by its subject and
purposes."80
The remainder of this comment is devoted to an examination of the
exception to the exclusive remedy doctrine for intentional torts. Since
the nature of intent plays such a crucial role in the development of this
exception, a brief study of the definition of intent is in order. The Re-
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(9) (1991).
74. Arrington v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 140 S.E.2d 759 (1965). See also Grice v. Su-
wanee Lumber Mfg. Co., 113 So. 2d 742 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (workers' compensation provides
no benefits for loss of testicle, and the exclusivity provisions bar a common law action).
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-9 (1991).
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-9 and 97-10.1 (1991); Brown v. Motor Inns of Carolina, Inc., 266
S.E.2d 848 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
77. Altman v. Sanders, 148 S.E.2d 21, 24 (N.C. 1966).
78. Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 409 F. Supp. 1211, 1215 (M.D.N.C. 1976), affid, 598 F.2d
616 (4th Cir. 1979); Strickland v. King, 239 S.E.2d 243, 244 (N.C. 1977).
79. Andrews v. Peters, 284 S.E.2d 748 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981), afid, 347 S.E.2d 409 (N.C. 1986).
80. Barber v. Minges, 25 S.E.2d 837 (N.C. 1943). An employee may bring a civil action against
an employer for failure to provide workers' compensation coverage (N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-95 and
97-94(b) (1991)) and for retaliatory discharge (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1 (1991)).
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statement of Torts states that intent "denote[s] that the actor desires to
cause the consequences of his act or that he believes that the conse-
quences are substantially certain to follow from it."'" An actor acts in-
tentionally when he acts for the purpose of causing the consequences of
his/her act or when he knows that the consequences are certain or sub-
stantially certain to result from his act.8 2 An actor who hits another with
a left jab acts for the purpose (with the specific intent) of causing contact
whereas an actor who pulls a chair out from under another who is about
to sit down acts with knowledge that contact is substantially certain to
occur.83 Most courts, including North Carolina courts, have applied the
intentional tort exception consistently with the Restatement definition in
cases involving misconduct where the employer desires to bring about
the consequences of his act, as in the cases of assault and battery. In
cases involving misconduct that fails to establish an act done for the pur-
pose of causing injury, the courts have deviated from the Restatement
definition of intent and blurred the distinction between reckless conduct
and intentional conduct.
B. Intentional Misconduct
1. Co-Employees
In Andrews v. Peters, 4 the court of appeals addressed the issue of
whether the Act was the exclusive remedy for an employee who was in-
tentionally injured by a co-employee. The plaintiff in this case brought
an assault and battery action against the defendant, a co-employee, for
injuries which resulted when the defendant walked behind the plaintiff
and placed his right knee behind her knee. The court held that a worker,
injured by the assaultive conduct of a co-employee, is not precluded from
bringing an intentional tort action against a fellow worker.8 5 The court
stated that "an intentional tort is not the type of 'industrial accident' to
which our legislature intended to give a co-employee immunity."86 The
court refused to employ the exclusivity provisions of the Act to shield a
co-employee from liability for assaultive conduct. 87 The court next ad-
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
82. Id. at cmt. b.
83. Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955); see infra notes 185-187 and accompanying
text.
84. 284 S.E.2d 748 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981).
85. Id. at 750.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 751. An employee who deliberately injured a co-worker received coverage from his
homeowners insurance policy. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stox, 412 S.E.2d 318
(N.C. 1992). The defendant pushed a fellow employee who fell and broke her arm. The defendant
deliberately pushed her but testified that he did not mean for her to fall. For the exclusionary
provision of the defendant's insurance policy for expected or intended injuries to apply, the defend-
ant must have intended the resulting injury. Since the plaintiffs only evidence was the intentional
11
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dressed the issue of whether the injured worker was otherwise barred
from a common law action because the worker already had recovered
benefits from the employer under the Act."8 On the issue of election of
remedies, the court held that "in cases of intentional misconduct by a co-
employee, the injured worker is free to pursue both his common law and
compensation remedies."8" The court acknowledged that in cases involv-
ing assaults by employers, the employee was required to elect between
suing his employer at common law and accepting compensation under
the Act' but found the rationale for election under these circumstances
inapplicable to assaults committed by co-employees. In the case of inten-
tional employer misconduct, without the requirement of election of rem-
edies, an employer would suffer the expense of defending the same claim
in two different forums.9" A co-employee, however, neither defends
against a workers' compensation claim nor contributes to the satisfaction
of such a claim. Barring a common law action would insulate the co-
employee from the consequences of his behavior.92 The court believed
that its holding would promote safer workplaces by providing financial
incentives for employees to work dutifully. 93
2. Employers
Assaults committed by an employer are treated in the same manner as
assaults committed by co-employees. The Act does not provide the exclu-
sive remedy for injuries caused by the deliberate assault of an employer. 94
The rationale supporting this exception is that "the employer will not be
heard to allege that the injury was 'accidental' and therefore was under
the exclusive provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, when he
himself intentionally committed the act." 95 Moreover, "[i]t would be
against sound reasoning to allow the employer deliberately to batter his
helper, and then compel the worker to accept moderate workmen's com-
nature of the act, the exclusionary provision did not apply. In addition, the court held that the
intentional act of the defendant was an occurrence or accident under the terms of the policy. Stox,
412 S.E.2d at 322.
88. It seems unlikely that an employer will be liable under the Act for the assault of an em-
ployee given the affirmative defenses provided by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12(3) (1991); see supra note
37.
89. Andrews, 284 S.E.2d at 751.
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing Warner v. Leder, 69 S.E.2d 6 (N.C. 1951), overruled by, Woodson v. Rowland,
407 S.E.2d 222 (N.C. 1991) and Essick v. City of Lexington, 60 S.E.2d 106 (N.C. 1950)).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 750, 752.
94. Essick v. Lexington, 60 S.E.2d 106 (N.C. 1950); Daniels v. Swofford, 286 S.E.2d 582 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1982).
95. 2A LARSON, supra note 17, § 68.11 at 13-4.
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pensation benefits. '" 96 Daniels v. Swofford 7 presented the question of
how corporate entities and their employees are to be treated when one of
their employees commits a battery. The defendant in this case, the cor-
porate president, kicked the plaintiff behind the knee during the course of
her employment, causing her to suffer personal injuries. The plaintiff
filed a civil action against the defendant and the corporation, alleging
intentional, unlawful, wanton, and malicious conduct. The court of ap-
peals held that unless the corporate employer acted for the purpose of
causing the injury, the Act provided the exclusive remedy.9" The acts of
a co-employee, even a supervisor, will not be imputed to the corporate
employer unless the assailant is the alter ego of the corporation.99 An
employee will be found to be acting as the alter ego of the corporate
employer only if the employer commanded or expressly authorized the
assault." ° In this case, although the defendant was the president of the
corporation, the plaintiff's claim against the corporation was barred by
the exclusive remedy provision because the plaintiff failed to allege that
the defendant was acting as an alter ego of the corporation. Simply alleg-
ing that the defendant was an agent of the corporation, acting within the
course, scope, and authority of his employment as a supervisory em-
ployee, is not sufficient to impute the malice of the assaultive co-em-
ployee to the corporation. As to the liability of the defendant for his
assaultive conduct, the court treated the defendant as a co-employee, ap-
plied the rule from Andrews v. Peters and held that the plaintiff could
pursue her common law action against the defendant.' 0 '
C. Aggravated Misconduct
1. Co-Employees
The Supreme Court of North Carolina addressed the issue of co-em-
ployee liability for willful, wanton, and reckless negligence in Pleasant v.
96. HOROVITZ, supra note 18, at 336. Under the Act, an injured worker is entitled to compen-
sation for lost earnings (N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-31 (1991)), medical care and treatment (N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 97-25 and 26 (1991)), disfigurement (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31(21) (1991)), attorney's fees
(N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-88 (1991)) and in the case of death, death benefits and burial expenses (N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 97-38 (1991)), but there is no provision in the Act allowing compensation for physical
pain or mental distress. (Jackson v. Fayetteville Area Sys. of Transp., 337 S.E.2d 110 (N.C. Ct. App.
1985)). See generally JERNIGAN, supra note 44, at §§ 12-15 (discussing the extent of workers' com-
pensation benefits).
97. 286 S.E.2d 582 (1982).
98. Id. at 585. The Act does not provide the exclusive remedy for claims of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress inflicted by an employer through its agents and employees. Hogan v.
Forsyth Country Club, 340 S.E.2d 116 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986), rev. denied, 346 S.E.2d 141 (N.C.
1986) (Since the employee's allegation was based on acts of sexual harassment which resulted in non-
physical injuries, the plaintiffs' tort action was not barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Act).
99. Id.
100. 2A LARSON, supra note 17, § 68-21, at 13-74.
101. Daniels, 286 S.E.2d at 586.
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Johnson. 02 Equally as important as the holding is the court's discussion
of the relationship between aggravated misconduct and intentional mis-
conduct. In Pleasant v. Johnson, the plaintiff was injured when the de-
fendant, a co-worker, attempted, as a joke, to drive a truck as close to the
plaintiff as he could without striking him. The defendant's joke failed
when the truck hit and injured the plaintiff's knee. The plaintiff filed a
civil action alleging that his injury was the result of the willful, reckless,
and wanton negligence of the defendant."0 3 The court held that such
allegations were sufficient to allege an intentional tort, enabling the plain-
tiff to overcome the exclusivity provisions. 1"
The court defined wanton conduct as "an act manifesting a reckless
disregard for the rights and safety of others""0 5 and willful negligence as
"the intentional failure to carry out some duty imposed by law or con-
tract which is necessary to the safety of the person or property to which
it is owed."" °  The court attempted to refine the definition of "willful
negligence" by distinguishing between a willful breach of duty and the
resulting injury. According to the court, when willfulness refers to a
breach of duty, the injury is negligently caused but when the willfulness
refers to the injury, the injury is intentionally caused.)17 If the injury is
willful, then the intent to injure need not be actual, and constructive in-
tent may provide the necessary mental state for an intentional tort. 0 8
The court stated that "constructive intent to injure exists where conduct
threatens the safety of others and is so reckless or manifestly indifferent
to the consequences that a finding of willfulness and wantonness
equivalent in spirit to actual intent is justified."" By using the theory of
constructive intent, the court was able to manipulate the definition of
intent to include willful, wanton, and reckless negligence, and avoid the
102. 325 S.E.2d 244 (N.C. 1985) (Meyer, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 247.
104. Id. at 249.
105. Id. at 248. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides the following definition of reckless:
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or inten-
tionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to
know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates
an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater
than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
106. Pleasant, 325 S.E.2d at 248. The intentional breach of a statutory duty does not of itself
establish recklessness. In order that the breach of a statute constitute recklessness, not only must the
statute be intentionally violated, but the precautions required by the statute must be such that their
omission will be acknowledged as involving a high degree of probability that serious harm will result.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 cmt. e (1965).
107. Pleasant, 325 S.E.2d at 248.
108. Id. This statement appears to be consistent with the Restatement definition that intent can
be established if the actor, although not desiring to cause the consequences of his act, knows that
they are substantially certain to occur. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
109. Pleasant. 325 S.E.2d at 248.
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exclusivity bar."' The court believed that its holding would promote
workplace safety by helping to deter reckless conduct in the future."'
To the extent that the court's holding promotes positive social change
in the workplace, there is little doubt that Pleasant is good law. The
problem with the decision is the analysis employed by the court to avoid
the exclusivity provisions of the Act. The facts in this case do not sup-
port a finding that the defendant acted for the purpose of injuring the
plaintiff because the defendant was trying to play a joke on the plaintiff.
The court did not consider whether the facts supported a finding that the
defendant acted with knowledge to a substantial certainty that injury
would result. According to the Restatement, intent is present only under
these two circumstances. When the court defined constructive intent in
terms of reckless conduct, it deviated from the Restatement definition of
intent because the Restatement specifically excludes reckless conduct
from its definition of intent." 2 The court, by blurring the distinction
between reckless and intentional conduct, may have laid the foundation
for the Woodson court's misapplication of the substantial certainty stan-
dard to the facts in that case.
2. Employers
In Freeman v. SCM Corp.,1"3 the plaintiff, an employee of the defend-
ant, reported to her supervisor that the machine she was using was mal-
functioning. Although the plaintiff continued to report the defect, she
was repeatedly ordered to continue working with the machine. The
plaintiff was later struck in the face by a bolt which flew out of the
machine. The plaintiff alleged that she was injured by the gross, willful,
and wanton negligence and intentional acts of the defendant. The North
Carolina Supreme Court, in aper curiam opinion, held that the plaintiff's
remedies under the Act were exclusive, precluding her from recovering
in this negligence action." 4
In Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co., 1 the Supreme Court of North
Carolina addressed the issue of whether the exclusive remedy doctrine
applied to an injury caused by the willful, wanton, and reckless negli-
110. The court found support for equating willful, wanton and reckless negligence with an inten-
tional act in cases where such conduct supports the recovery of punitive damages (Hinson v. Daw-
son, 92 S.E.2d 393 (N.C. 1956)) and in cases where reckless conduct implies malice necessary to
support a second degree murder charge (State v. Snyder, 317 S.E.2d 394 (N.C. 1984)).
111. Pleasant, 325 S.E.2d at 250. The court's decision overruled Wesley v. Lea, 114 S.E.2d 350
(N.C. 1960) and Warner v. Leder, 69 S.E.2d 6 (N.C. 1952). Id.
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A illus. 2 (1965).
113. 316 S.E.2d 81 (N.C. 1984).
114. Id. at 82.
115. 340 S.E.2d 295 (1986) (Exum, Martin & Frye, JJ., dissenting), overruled, Woodson v. Row-
land, 407 S.E.2d 222 (N.C. 1991).
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gence of an employer." 6 The plaintiff's daughter, an employee of the
defendant, died after receiving second and third-degree burns over sev-
enty percent of her body in an explosion and fire at the defendant's man-
ufacturing plant. After receiving compensation under the Act, her
parents sued the employer alleging that the defendant acted "recklessly,
wantonly, willfully, intentionally and with reckless disregard of the rights
and safety of plaintiff's intestate or with full knowledge and actual intent
that defendant's willful misconduct would expose plaintiff's intestate to
serious injury, harm or death."I 17 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant
handled and stored liquefied petroleum gases without inspections and ap-
provals required by law, and violated the National Electrical Code and
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of North Carolina by: 1) using
plastic bags to cover meters designed to detect and warn of dangerous gas
levels; 2) turning off alarms which could detect explosive gas levels; and
3) instructing employees to resume work despite the sounding of the
alarms. I I8 At trial, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment
arguing that the plaintiff's action was barred by the exclusive remedy
provisions of the Act, and if the complaint alleged an intentional assault,
the plaintiff was barred from further recovery by having made a binding
election to receive benefits under the Act. 19 The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant 2 ° and on appeal, the court
of appeals affirmed. 121
The court declined to apply the intentional tort exception because the
plaintiff's daughter was not killed as a result of the deliberate assault of
her employer, and held that an employee injured by the willful and wan-
ton negligence of an employer may not pursue a common law tort ac-
tion. 122 The opinion, written by Justice Meyer, included the following
rule:
[T]he common-law liability of the employer cannot, under the almost
unanimous rule, be stretched to include accidental injuries caused by the
gross, wanton, wilful, deliberate, intentional, reckless, culpable, or mali-
cious negligence, breach of statute, or other misconduct of the employer
short of genuine intentional injury .... Even if the alleged conduct goes
beyond aggravated negligence, and includes such elements as knowingly
permitting a hazardous work condition to exist, knowingly ordering
claimant to perform an extremely dangerous job, wilfully failing to fur-
nish a safe place to work, or even wilfully and unlawfully violating a
116. Id. at 297.
117. Id. at 297-98.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 299.
120. Id.
121. Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co., 317 S.E.2d 51 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (Phillips, J., dissent-
ing), overruled in part, Woodson v. Rowland, 407 S.E.2d 222 (N.C. 1991).
122. Barrino, 340 S.E.2d at 297.
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safety statute, this still falls short of the kind of actual intention to injure
that robs the injury of accidental character. 123
For Justice Meyer and Professor Larson, nothing less than the deliberate
intent to injure is sufficient to escape the bar of the exclusive remedy
doctrine. Justice Meyer went so far as to cite, in support of the majority
holding, a case in which the Supreme Court of Georgia held that an em-
ployee, ordered by the president of the corporation to work with his bare
hands in a vat of acid, was limited to workers' compensation benefits. 24
Moreover, even if the court found that the plaintiff had sufficiently
alleged an action grounded in an intentional tort, the plaintiff would still
have been barred from pursuing a common law remedy because the
plaintiff had already made a binding election to recover compensation
under the Act. 125 The plaintiff's allegations concerning violations of the
National Electric Code and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
North Carolina were also held insufficient to avoid the bar of the exclu-
sive remedy provisions. 126 The effect of safety code violations on work-
ers' compensation claims is provided for in section 97-12 of the North
Carolina General Statutes. This statute increases workers' compensation
benefits by only ten percent when the employee is proximately injured or
killed by the employer's willful failure to comply with any statutory re-
quirement or any order of the Industrial Commission.127
The majority recognized the harshness of the rule but was unwilling to
overrule Freeman. Justice Martin, in his dissenting opinion, which is
currently the law in North Carolina after Woodson, stated that because
the case was decided on summary judgment, the proper question was
whether the plaintiff's evidence created a genuine issue of material fact
123. Id. at 300 (quoting 2A LARSON, supra note 17, § 68.13, at 13-10).
124. Southern Wire & Iron, Inc., v. Fowler, 124 S.E.2d 738 (Ga. 1962) (The corporate president
transferred the defendant from his job as a clerk and ordered him to work with his bare hands in a
vat of acid which the employer knew was dangerous to human skin. The defendant alleged that the
corporate president committed this act because the defendant refused to divulge the names of his
fellow workers who attended a labor meeting). Southern Wire & Iron, Inc. v. Fowler, 105 S.E.2d
764 (Ga. Ct. App. 1958). The Supreme Court of Georgia characterized the employer's conduct as a
failure to provide a safe workplace. Southern Wire, 124 S.E.2d at 740.
125. Barrino, 340 S.E.2d at 303.
126. Id. at 304. Violations of the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act do not affect work-
ers' compensation laws. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1985). The federal Occupational Safety and Health
Act states:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any manner affect any workmen's
compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or affect in any other manner the common law or
statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under any law with respect to
injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out of, or in the course of, employment.
29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1985). The court applied this same principle in denying the plaintiff a remedy
at common law for violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of North Carolina. Bar-
rino, 340 S.E.2d at 304.
127. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1991) Similarly, if an employee fails to use a safety appliance or
perform a statutory duty and where such failure is the proximate cause of the injury or death,
compensation is reduced by ten percent. Id.
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concerning the defendant's intent.1 28  The dissenting opinion stated a
broader definition of the intent necessary to overcome the application of
the exclusive remedy provisions which, if applied to the facts of the case,
would have created a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to overcome
the defendant's motion for summary judgment.1 29
Justice Martin's dissenting opinion stated that the intentional tort ex-
ception should apply to acts which an employer knows are substantially
certain to cause injury or death.130 As support, Justice Martin cited sec-
tion 8A of the Restatement of Torts which states: "Intent is not, however,
limited to consequences which are desired. If the actor knows that the
consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act,
and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to
produce the result."'3a The dissent stated that based on. the facts of this
case the death of the plaintiff's daughter "or one of her co-workers was,
at the very least, 'substantially certain' to occur given the defendant's
deliberate failure to observe even basic safety laws."'' 32 By adopting a
broader notion of intent for purposes of the exclusive remedy doctrine,
the courts could significantly deter intentional employer misconduct
"which is likely to endanger the lives and safety of thousands of
workers". 133
The dissenting justices found both Freeman and Pleasant inapplicable
to the facts in this case because those cases dealt solely with negligent
misconduct. According to the dissenting opinion, the facts in the case
presented a pattern of criminal misconduct '3' because the deliberate dis-
regard of basic safety regulations endangered the lives of every employee
of the defendant.1 35 On the issue of the defense of election of remedies,
the dissenting opinion, without mention of Andrews v. Peters, 36 stated
that an employee injured by the intentional conduct of his/her employer
is. not required to make a binding election between compensation under
the Act and a remedy at common law.1 37 The dissenters disagreed with
the argument that compensation under the Act and remedies at common
law were mutually exclusive because an intentional injury could not be
defined as an accident within the provisions of the Act. Justice Martin
128. Barrino, 340 S.E.2d at 305.
129. Id. at 305.
130. Id.
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b (1965).
132. Barrino, 340 S.E.2d at 305. On whether facts like these satisfy the substantial certainty
standard, see supra note 105 and infra notes 185-190 and accompanying text.
133. Id. at 306.
134. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-139 (1991) (stating that a willful violation of an Occupational Safety
and Health Act rule is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of up to $10,000 and/or imprisonment
for up to six months if the violation causes the death of an employee).
135. Barrino, 340 S.E.2d at 307.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 84-93.
137. Barrino, 340 S.E.2d at 307-08.
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argued that from the perspective of the employee, "an unexpected assault
may be considered an accident despite its characterization as an inten-
tional tort.' 38 The dissenting opinion stated that if the purpose of the
defense of election of remedies is to prevent double recovery, then this
purpose could be accomplished by reducing a worker's award in tort by
the amount of workers' compensation already recovered, or by granting
the employer's insurance carrier a right of subrogation, without forcing
the injured worker to choose between workers' compensation and a com-
mon law remedy. 
39
IV. WooDsoN V. ROWLAND
Simply stated, the Supreme Court of North Carolina in the case of
Woodson v. Rowland"4 adopted the views of the dissenting opinion in
Barrino.t4' The court held:
[W]hen an employer intentionally engages in misconduct knowing it is
substantially certain to cause serious injury or death to employees and an
employee is injured or killed by that misconduct, that employee, or the
personal representative of the estate in the case of death, may pursue a
civil action against the employer. Such misconduct is tantamount to an
intentional tort, and civil actions based thereon are not barred by the
exclusivity provisions of the Act. Because. . . the injury or death caused
by such misconduct is nonetheless the result of an accident under the
Act, workers' compensation claims may also be pursued. There may,
however, only be one recovery.' 42
As is true of all cases requiring proof of intent, the facts are particu-
larly important. The decedent in this case, Thomas Sprouse, was hired
by Morris Rowland Utility, Incorporated (Rowland Utility), a subcon-
tractor for co-defendant Davidson & Jones, Incorporated (Davidson &
Jones), to dig two trenches for sewer lines to be installed for the devel-
oper and co-defendant Pinnacle One Associates (Pinnacle One). On the
first day of digging, Davidson & Jones and Rowland Utility each sup-
plied one crew. The foreman for the Davidson & Jones crew refused to
allow his men to work in the trench because it was not sloped, shored, or
braced and lacked a trench box. The Occupational Safety and Health
Act of North Carolina required that these safety precautions be fol-
lowed.'43 The president of Rowland Utility, Morris Rowland, supplied a
trench box for the Davidson & Jones crew but did not supply one for his
138. Id. at 308 (quoting Daniels v. Swofford, 286 S.E.2d 582, 584 (N.C. App. 1982)).
139. Id. An injured worker who is not earning income cannot be described as freely choosing
one remedy over another. Id.
140. 407 S.E.2d 222 (N.C. 1991) (Meyer & Mitchell, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
141. Woodson, 407 S.E.2d at 228; see supra text accompanying notes 128-139.
142. Woodson, 407 S.E.2d at 228 (emphasis added).
143. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-136(g) (1991).
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own crew. In the previous six and one-half years, Rowland Utility had
been cited four times for violating trench safety procedures. ' The fore-
man for the Davidson & Jones crew testified that the Rowland Utility
trench was not properly sloped and that he "would never [have] put a
man in it."' 45 On the next day the Davidson & Jones crew did not work
and although its trench box was unused, Morris Rowland and the project
supervisor decided not to use it. Shortly after the digging began, the
ditch collapsed, completely burying Mr. Sprouse and burying another
man, the project supervisor's son, up to his chest. Morris Rowland took
the supervisor's son to the hospital while the other workers attempted to
dig out Mr. Sprouse. The workers refused several offers of help and by
the time they unearthed Mr. Sprouse he was dead. The plaintiff, admin-
istrator of Mr. Sprouse's estate, filed suit against Rowland Utility, Morris
Rowland, Davidson & Jones, and Pinnacle One and filed a workers' com-
pensation claim. The Industrial Commission granted the plaintiff's re-
quest not to hear her case until the completion of the civil actions, thus
the plaintiff had not received any compensation under the Act. The trial
court granted all of the defendants' motions for summary judgment and
the court of appeals affirmed.14 6
On appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court, Chief Justice Exum,
writing for the majority, found support for broadening the definition of
intentional injury to include acts which an employer knows are substan-
tially certain to cause injury or death in the concept of constructive intent
and in a small number of jurisdictions that apply the substantial certainty
test for work related injuries.'47 As discussed previously, the concept of
constructive intent implies an actual intent to cause injury or death when
an actor acts willfully, wantonly, and recklessly. 48 The Woodson court
did not employ the concept of constructive intent, as the Pleasant court
did, as a means of establishing intentional misconduct sufficient to over-
come the exclusive remedy bar. The Woodson court adopted the Restate-
ment definition of intent in order to establish the intentional misconduct
on the part of the employer and enable the plaintiff to overcome the ex-
clusivity provisions of the Act.'49 The court stated clearly that willful,
144. Woodson, 407 S.E.2d at 231.
145. Id.
146. Woodson v. Rowland, 373 S.E.2d 674 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (Phillips, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
147. Woodson, 407 S.E.2d at 229. The court cited: Griffin v. George's, Inc., 589 S.W.2d 24 (Ark.
1979); Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., 246 S.E.2d 907 (W.Va. 1978); Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So.2d 475
(La. 1981); Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co., 398 N.W.2d 882 (Mich. 1986); Jones v. VIP Dev. Co.,
472 N.E.2d 1046 (Ohio 1986); Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc., 433 N.E.2d 572
(Ohio 1982); VerBouwens v. Hamm Wood Prod., 334 N.W.2d 874 (S.D. 1983). Woodson, 407
S.E.2d at 229. For a discussion of the treatment of the exclusive remedy doctrine in West Virginia
and Ohio, see infra notes 192-208 and 237-238 and accompanying text.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 105-111.
149. Woodson, 407 S.E.2d at 229.
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wanton, and reckless misconduct of a co-employee would be sufficient to
establish the right to pursue a common law remedy, but that willful,
wanton,: and reckless misconduct of an employer would not be sufficient
to overcome the exclusive remedy provision. 5 ° The court stated that the
Pleasant holding was sound but that "it [was] also in keeping with the
statutory workers' compensation trade-offs to require that civil actions
against employers be grounded on more aggravated conduct than actions
against co-employees."'' It would also be in keeping with the policy
consideration of promoting safe workplaces, given the far-reaching ef-
fects of employer misconduct, to allow civil actions against employers to
be grounded on less aggravated conduct than actions against employees.
Applying the substantial certainty standard to the facts in this case,
the court found that the plaintiff, in her claim against Rowland Utility,
presented sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact
regarding whether Morris Rowland's conduct satisfied the substantial
certainty standard. 152 An expert witness for the plaintiff testified that
because the trench had sheer vertical walls of fourteen feet, there was "an
exceedingly high probability of failure and the trench was substantially
certain to fail."' 53 The court found evidence that Morris Rowland had
knowledge of the danger of the trench. His career consisted of excavat-
ing different kinds of soil; he had been cited four times for violating
trench digging safety procedures; he was present at the site and directed
his crew to dig without the trench box even though one was available
As to the plaintiff's claim against Morris Rowland individually, the court
held that the plaintiff could not proceed against Morris Rowland as a co-
employee based on the Pleasant holding because Morris Rowland was
the corporate president and sole shareholder of Rowland Utility, but he
could be held individually liable for an intentional tort based on the sub-
stantial certainty standard. 54 Since Rowland Utility's liability was de-
pendent on the acts of its president, and since the plaintiff presented
sufficient evidence to survive Rowland Utility's motion for summary
judgment, the plaintiff's evidence was necessarily sufficient to survive
Morris Rowland's motion for summary judgment.' Even though the
court found that the facts in this case satisfied the substantial certainty
standard, this comment asks whether the facts in this case are not more
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 231. The plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence that Morris Rowland, as chief
executive officer, was exercising corporate authority while directing the trench digging so as to attri-
bute his conduct to his employer, Rowland Utility. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 232. The court stated "that in the workers' compensation context, corporate officers
and directors are treated the same as their corporate employer vis-a-vis application of the exclusivity
principle." Id.
155. Id. at 233.
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indicative of reckless conduct than conduct that is substantially certain
to cause injury or death.
On the issue of election of remedies, the court restated the analysis of
the dissent in Barrino and held:
Although... plaintiff may continue to pursue her civil action .... she
is not barred from simultaneously pursuing her workers compensation
claim because the injury to her intestate was the result of an "accident"
as that term is used in the Act. A claimant may, but is not required to,
elect between these remedies but, in any event, is entitled to but one
recovery.15
6
Double recovery is avoided by requiring the claimant who receives com-
pensation in a civil action to reimburse the workers' compensation car-
rier for sums duplicated by the civil remedy or by subrogating the carrier
for the claimant to the extent of benefits paid by the carrier. 15 7 The court
believed that denying -a remedy at common law based on the defense of
election of remedies would undermine the overall policy of discouraging
intentional misconduct. 158
In the shadow of this landmark holding, the court also addressed the
issue of whether Davidson & Jones and Pinnacle One breached nondele-
gable duties owed to Mr. Sprouse.' 59 The court's holding on this issue
can easily be overlooked, but the factual circumstances giving rise to
nondelegable duties may provide a fuller understanding of the court's
substantial certainty standard.
. Generally, an employer is not liable for the torts of an independent
contractor so long as .the employer used due care in the selection of a
competent contractor to do the work."W An employer may be held vi-
cariously liable for the torts of an independent contractor where the em-
ployer is found to have a nondelegable duty or the employment involves
inherently dangerous activities. 1 6 The plaintiff contended that Davidson
& Jones and Pinnacle One breached nondelegable duties owed to Mr.
Sprouse while he was involved in the inherently dangerous activity of
trench digging. The court addressed the issue of the liability of Davidson
& Jones and Pinnacle One by stating that "one who employs an in-
dependent contractor to perform an inherently dangerous activity may
not delegate to the independent contractor the duty to provide for the
safety of others."' 162 The facts in this case illustrate that "the line be-
156. Id. (citations omitted). The court overruled Wesley v. Lea, 114 S.E.2d 350 (N.C. 1960) and
Warner v. Leder, 69 S.E.2d 6 (N.C. 1952) to the extent that they prohibited the simultaneous pursuit
of civil and workers' compensation remedies. Id.
157. Woodson, 407 S.E.2d at 233.
158. Id. at 234.
159. Id.
160. DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 21, at § 23.30.
161. Id. at § 23.31.
162. Woodson, 407 S.E.2d at 235.
1992]
22
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 2 [1992], Art. 5
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol20/iss2/5
186 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:164
tween non-delegable duties and inherently dangerous activities [can be]
simply blurred."' 163 The policy considerations reflected in the liability of
an employer and an independent contractor for injuries resulting from
inherently dangerous activities are "that certain obligations are of such
importance that employers should not be able to escape liability merely
by hiring others to perform them,"' 64 and, with vicarious liability, "there
is a greater likelihood that the safety precautions necessary to substan-
tially eliminate the danger will be followed."' 65 This latter policy judg-
ment has been used by North Carolina courts to justify the imposition of
tort liability for injuries caused by intentional employer misconduct. 66
On the question of whether an inherently dangerous activity may be
determined by the court as a matter of law or whether it is a factual
question for the jury, the court could not agree.' 67 The majority held:
In determining whether the trenching process which killed Thomas
Sprouse was inherently dangerous, the focus is not on some abstract ac-
tivity called "trenching." The focus is on the particular trench being dug
and the pertinent circumstances surrounding the digging. It must be
shown that because of these circumstances, the digging of the trench it-
self presents a "a recognizable and substantial danger inherent in the
work, as distinguished from a danger collaterally created by the in-
dependent negligence of the contractor."' 168
What is readily apparent from the court's conclusion is that the same
evidence which established the intentional conduct of Rowland Utility
and Morris Rowland will, for purposes of determining the general con-
tractor's liability in negligence, also establish the inherent danger of the
trenching. What remains unclear is the connection, beyond mere eviden-
tiary matters, between the substantial certainty standard and the substan-
tial danger requirement. Since the court characterized Rowland Utility's
and Morris Rowland's conduct as intentional, should a general contrac-
tor like Davidson & Jones be held liable for the intentional torts of its
subcontractor? The Woodson court answered in the affirmative. The
court found the plaintiff's evidence sufficient to survive Davidson &
Jones's motion for summary judgment, stating that, "Davidson & Jones
had a continuing duty of due care toward the plaintiff's intestate during
this entire time, and plaintiff's forecast of evidence tends to show a
breach of this duty."' 169 This comment questions the soundness of hold-
163. DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 21, at § 23.31.
164. Woodson, 407 S.E.2d at 235 (quoting DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 21 at § 23.31).
165. Id.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 93, 111 and 133.
167. Woodson, 407 S.E.2d at 235. The dissent argued that activities are either inherently danger-
ous or not as a matter of law. Id. at 240. See generally DAYE & MORRIS, supra note 21, at § 23.33
(discussing whether an inherently dangerous activity is a question of law or fact).
168. Woodson, 407 S.E.2d at 237 (quoting Evans v. Elliott, 17 S.E.2d 125, 128 (N.C. 1941)).
169. Id. at 238. The court used as evidence to support its holding the knowledge possessed by
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ing a general contractor liable for the intentional torts of a subcontractor,
but a more thorough discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this
comment.
V. BEYOND WOODSON
A. Applying Woodson
In the largest Woodson settlement to date, one hundred and eight
workers settled asbestos-related damage claims brought against Duke
Power for over ten million dollars. t7 ° The plaintiffs alleged that Duke
Power failed to warn workers of the dangers of handling asbestos after
the hazard became known to Duke Power, failed to provide a safe work-
place, failed to inform workers of X-rays revealing asbestos-related dis-
Davidson & Jones that Rowland Utility was not following the proper safety procedures. Since the
developer, Pinnacle One, had no such knowledge, the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of
Pinnacle One. Id; But see Cook v. Morrison, 413 S.E.2d 922 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (no evidence
presented that defendant knew or should have known of the circumstances that led to the decedent's
death in a trenching accident).
Nine months after the Woodson decision, the administratrix of Thomas Sprouse's estate settled her
claims with Davidson & Jones, Rowland Utility, and Morris Rowland for $426,000. Of that sum,
$350,000 represented payments made by Davidson & Jones and Rowland Utility and $76,000 repre-
sented payments recovered under the Act. The parties agreed that the plaintiff would not be re-
quired to reimburse the workers compensation carrier from the settlement with Davidson & Jones
and Rowland Utility. Jay Reeves, Woodson Settles Pre-Trial, N.C. LAW. WKLY., May 25, 1992, at
1, 3.
170. 108 Suits Have Been Settled, N.C. LAW. WKLY., May 11, 1992, at 1. This case raises the
issue of the right of a third party to contribution from an employer under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-10.2
(1991). In the Duke Power case, the injured employees received workers' compensation and a settle-
ment from a Woodson claim. The employees also recovered in tort, under § 97-10.2, from the sellers
of the asbestos. The sellers claimed that they were entitled, pursuant to § 97-10.2(e), to contribution
from the employer in the amount paid by the employer. Telephone Interview with David A. Shelby,
Attorney for the law firm of Wallace and Whitley ( Sept. 10, 1992). Section 97-10.2(e) provides that
if the verdict against the third party included a finding of negligence on the part of the employer, the
third party is entitled to contribution from the employer by the amount which the employer would
recover by way of subrogation. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2(e) (1991). The amount of the em-
ployer's subrogation claim is the amount of workers' compensation paid. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-
10.2(f)(l)(c) (1991). Section 97-10.2(e) provides that after the court reduces the verdict against the
third party by the amount of workers' compensation paid by the employer, "the entire amount
recovered ... shall belong to the employee or his personal representative free of any claim by the
employer and the third party shall have no further right by way of contribution or otherwise against
the employer" except as may exist by an express contract of indemnity. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-
10.2(e) (1991). The statute appears to limit the third party's right to contribution to the amount of
workers' compensation paid by the employer. The problem with this interpretation is that without
requiring contribution from the employer in the amount of the Woodson claim, the employee re-
ceives double recovery. If the employer is not found negligent in the third party action, then the
third parties rights are defined under the Uniform Joint Tort-Feasors Act. N.C. GEN. STAT. § IB-I
-7 (1992). Relevant to the issue of intentional misconduct, the Uniform Joint Tort-Feasors Act
provides that there is no right of contribution in favor of one who intentionally causes or contributes
to the injury or wrongful death. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-l(c) (1992). Under the Uniform Joint Tort-
Feasors Act, an employer, whose liability includes a Woodson claim, would be liable for contribu-
tion. However, § 97-10.2 might completely abrogate the statutory rights under the Uniform Joint
Tort-Feasors Act. Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 75 S.E.2d 768 (N.C. 1953). But
cf Thompson v. Stearns Chem. Corp., 345 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1984)
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eases, and failed to follow federal safety regulations.t 7 ' These settlements
illustrate that the Woodson decision, by expanding the liability of em-
ployers- in tort, has provided plaintiff's lawyers with a powerful new the-
ory of recovery. Plaintiff's lawyers should not frivolously file Woodson
claims in an attempt to gain leverage for negotiations. One lawyer went
so far as to file a Woodson claim under the North Carolina Tort Claims
Act. 72 In Winebarger v. N. C. Department of Transportation, the Indus-
trial Commission made clear, what should already have been clear to the
plaintiff's attorney in this case, that a Woodson claim is an intentional
tort action outside the scope of the North Carolina Tort Claims Act, not
a negligence action. 73
Another case that illustrates the lengths to which plaintiff's attorneys
will go to file a Woodson claim is Journigan v. Fast Fare, Inc. 174  The
plaintiff's daughter was stabbed to death while working for the defend-
ant. The plaintiff filed this action alleging negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, and moved to amend the complaint to include a Woodson
claim based on the defendant's failure to provide a safe place for the
plaintiff's daughter to work. The court permitted the plaintiff to amend
his complaint but stated that, "to prove that working at a convenience
store in a bad neighborhood is 'substantially certain' to result in death,
seems a herculean task."' 75 Journigan and Winebarger also demonstrate
the extent to which attorneys are struggling to define for themselves what
substantial certainty means.
A more notable case, addressing the retroactive application of the
Woodson decision, is Dunleavy v. Yates Construction Co. 176 On facts re-
markably similar to those in Woodson, 177 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals held that the Woodson decision would apply retroactively to
171. 108 Suits Have Been Settled, N.C. LAW. WKLY., May 11, 1992, at 3. Most of the claims
were brought by attorney Mona Lisa Wallace of the Salisbury firm Wallace and Whitley. Id. Ms.
Wallace settled another Woodson claim for $600,000, one of the top fifty largest settlements in
North Carolina this year, in the case of Smith v. Hoechst Celanese Corp. Large Verdicts and Settle-
ments, N.C. LAW. WKLY., Aug. 24, 1992 at 3, 14 (Special Supplement). In Brewington v. Robeson
County, an emergency medical technician who contracted hepatitis B at work settled a Woodson
claim for $25,0000. The plaintiff alleged that the county failed to provide hepatitis B vaccinations,
despite being repeatedly asked to do so implement safety measures to protect him from the disease.
Jay Reeves, Unvaccinated EMT Gets Woodson Damages, N.C. LAW. WKLY., Nov. 16, 1992, at 1.
172. Woodson Case Booted from Tort Claims, N.C. LAW. WKLY., June 15, 1992 at 1.
173. Id. The plaintiff in this case was injured when a ditch he was working in collapsed. Id. at
4. On the issue of whether working in a ditch without proper safeguards satisfies the substantial
certainty standard see infra notes 182-187 and accompanying text.
174. Journigan v. Fast Fare, Inc., No. 92-41-CIV-5-F (E.D.N.C. Apr. 11, 1992). One attorney
was so eager to employ Woodson as a theory of recovery for plaintiffs in Hamlet that he improperly
solicited legal business and was charged by the North Carolina State Bar. 21 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA)
No. 20, at 557 (Oct. 16, 1991).
175. Journigan v. Fast Fare, Inc., No. 92-41-CIV-5-F, slip op. at 5 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 11, 1992).
176. 416 S.E.2d 193 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992), rev. denied, 421 S.E.2d 146 (N.C. 1992).
177. The worker in this case was killed when a ditch, which was improperly supported, col-
lapsed on top of him. In addition, the employer did not provide the worker with a hard hat. The
25
Lambert: From Andrews to Woodson and Beyond: The Development of the Intent
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1992
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
cases arising before August 14, 1991, the date of the Woodson deci-
sion.' ' Judge Greene's unanimous opinion stated that judicial policy
dictates that North Carolina Supreme Court decisions be presumed to
operate retroactively, and although the Woodson court was silent on the
issue of the retroactive application of its decision, the Supreme Court
ordered the court of appeals to reconsider Dunleavy in light of
Woodson. 179
In Pendergrass v. Child Care, Inc., '80 the plaintiff injured his arm
while working at a textile machine and brought an action against his two
supervisors, his employer, and the manufacturer of the machine alleging
willful negligence and intentional misconduct. The plaintiff's supervisors
altered the machine by removing the safety guards in violation of OSHA
regulations and industry standards. As to the claims against the supervi-
sors, the court held that
[a]lthough they may have known certain dangerous parts of the machine
were unguarded when they instructed Mr. Pendergrass to work at the
machine .... this [fails to support] an inference that they intended that
Mr. Pendergrass be injured or that they were manifestly indifferent to the
consequences of his doing so. 1 8 '
The plaintiff's allegation failed to satisfy the standard enunciated in
Pleasant, and the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal.182 The court
also affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the claim against the plaintiff's
employer. Since the plaintiff's Woodson claim was based on the same
facts, if the allegation failed to support a finding of willful, wanton, and
reckless negligence, then it also did "not rise to the higher level of negli-
gence as defined in Woodson. ''i 3
B. Critical Analysis
There has been much debate on the propriety of expanding the inten-
tional tort exception of the exclusive remedy doctrine to include harms
plaintiff brought an action against the property owner, the independent contractor, officers of the
independent contractor and the foreman on the project. Id. at 195.
178. Id. at 196. The court based its holding partly on the " 'Blackstonian Doctrine' of judicial
decision-making, also known as the 'declaratory theory of law' which provides that courts do not
make law, they merely discover and announce it." Id. (citations omitted)
179. 416 S.E.2d at 196. The court also held that a landowner who hires an independent contrac-
tor to perform an inherently dangerous activity may be liable to the employees of the independent
contractor if he had knowledge of the circumstances creating the danger. Id. at 197.
180. Pendergrass v. Child Care, Inc., 424 S.E.2d 391 (N.C. 1993).
181. Id. at 394.
182. Id. Since the complaint was drafted before the Woodson decision, the Supreme Court
should have remanded the case to the trial court for a further examination of the facts giving rise to
the claim. Michael Dayton, OSHA Violation Fails Woodson Standard, N.C. LAW. WKLY., Jan. 18,
1993, at 1, 3. Ordering employees to work without safety guards is very similar to, if not identical
with, placing a worker in a trench which is not properly secured.
183. 424 S.E.2d at 395. For a discussion of the court's treatment of the plaintiff's Woodson claim
under the dual capacity doctrine, see infra note 192.
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which the employer knows are substantially certain to occur. 8 4 The
question raised by the Woodson decision is whether these facts are suffi-
cient to meet the substantial certainty standard. The facts in Woodson
are insufficient to meet the substantial certainty standard as defined by
the Restatement, and the facts demonstrate, at most, willful, wanton, and
reckless conduct on the part of the sub-contractor.
The case of Garratt v. Dailey 85 presents facts which satisfy the sub-
stantial certainty standard. This case is included in torts casebooks to
help first year students understand the prong of intent embracing con-
duct done with knowledge that injury is substantially certain to occur.18 6
In this case, the six year old defendant pulled a chair out from under his
aunt, the plaintiff, as she was about to sit down. Since the plaintiff was
about to sit down when the defendant pulled out the chair, the defendant
knew that his act would cause his aunt to fall on the ground. Had the
defendant pulled the chair away while the plaintiff was elsewhere inside
the house, the defendant would not have known with substantial cer-
tainty that she would fall. She might simply have sat in a different chair.
The defendant in Garratt possessed the requisite knowledge to establish
an intentional tort because the probability that his aunt would fall was
substantially certain given the fact that she was in the process of sitting
down when he moved the chair, and the defendant knew it.
The Restatement provides the following illustration as an example of
conduct which an actor knows is substantially certain to cause injury:
A throws a bomb into B's office for the purpose of killing B. A knows
that C, B's stenographer, is in the office. A has no desire to injure C, but
knows that this act is substantially certain to do so. C is injured by the
explosion. A is subject to liability to C for an intentional tort.' 87
In the Restatement illustration, as in Garratt, injury is imminent. The
bomb will explode. Since the bomb will explode, A knows with substan-
tial certainty that anyone in the office will be hurt or killed. Although
the employers in Woodson and at the Imperial Food Products plant had
knowledge of the safety violations, they can not be attributed with the
knowledge that injury or death was substantially certain to occur. To
possess the requisite knowledge establishing intentional conduct, the em-
ployers in Woodson would have to have known that the ditch would col-
lapse and the employers in Hamlet would have to have known that the
plant would catch on fire. The defendant in Garratt possessed the requi-
184. E.g., 2A LARSON, supra note 17, at § 68.15; Helga L. Leftwich, Note, The Intentional-Tort
Exception to the Workers' Compensation Exclusive Remedy Provision: Woodson v. Rowland, 70 N.C.
L. REV. 849 (1992).
185. 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955).
186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). See supra text accompanying notes 81-
83.
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A illus. 1 (1965).
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site knowledge because he saw his aunt sitting down when he removed
the chair. A, in the Restatement illustration, possessed the requisite
knowledge because (s)he knew that the bomb would explode. The em-
ployer in Woodson knew that if the ditch collapsed a worker would be
killed or injured, and the employers at Hamlet knew that if the plant
caught on fire there would be injury or death. For the employers in
Woodson and Hamlet to possess the knowledge necessary to establish in-
tent, a further condition is required before injury or death can be prop-
erly termed "substantially certain" to occur. Violations of safety
regulations certainly increase the likelihood that injury or death will oc-
cur, but, as exemplified by the Imperial Food Products plant, safety vio-
lations can exist for years before they contribute to the first death. The
probability that injury or death will follow becomes less than substan-
tially certain because the safety violations can exist for years before the
first accident."' 8 "As the probability that the consequences will follow
decreases, and becomes less than substantial certainty, the actor's con-
duct loses the character of intent, and becomes mere recklessness, as de-
fined by § 500."' 9 To say that violations of safety regulations made the
deaths in Woodson or at Hamlet substantially certain to occur is to make
a giant leap to the conclusion that the ditch was substantially certain to
collapse and that plant was substantially certain to catch on fire. More-
over, by stating that the trench in Woodson was substantially certain to
cave-in, the court, a fortiori, is finding that Rowland Utility and Morris
Rowland committed a battery when they placed Thomas Sprouse in the
trench. The absurdity of this conclusion illustrates the court's overly
broad application of the substantial certainty standard. The misapplica-
tion of the substantial certainty standard by the Woodson court is consis-
tent with the faulty analysis of the Pleasant court. The Woodson court
appears to have confused the Pleasant court's definition of constructive
intent with the Restatement definition of intent, thus blurring the distinc-
tion between reckless conduct and conduct that is substantially certain to
cause death or serious injury. The misconduct in Woodson and at Ham-
let can therefore be more accurately described as willful, wanton, and
reckless negligence. 190
By incorrectly finding that the facts in Woodson satisfied the substan-
tial certainty standard, the North Carolina Supreme Court contributed
to the confusion surrounding the meaning of substantial certainty. As
further evidence of the confusion, there is the court's own imprecise use
of language in Pendergrass. 191 In dismissing the plaintiff's claim, the
188. 2A LARSON, supra note 17, § 68.15, at 13-62.
189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b (1965).
190. See supra note 105 for the Restatement definition of reckless conduct.
191. See supra notes 180-183 and accompanying text.
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court stated that the evidence failed to rise to the level of negligence as
defined in Woodson. Legally, Woodson was not about negligence or ag-
gravated misconduct. The decision is premised on the definition of in-
tent. The preceding two examples should provide guidance on the
fundamental distinction between reckless conduct and intentional con-
duct, but this comment seeks first to uncover the definition of substantial
certainty as used by courts in workers' compensation cases and second,
to determine how to plead a Woodson claim. Both objectives can be ac-
complished by examining the law in jurisdictions which have adopted the
substantial certainty definition. These two goals are by no means in-
dependent of one another. Determining the meaning of substantial cer-
tainty can provide information on how to plead Woodson claims, and
examining pleadings can provide aid in defining substantial certainty.
C. Substantial Certainty
Ohio adopted the substantial certainty standard as part of the excep-
tion for intentional torts in the case of Jones v. VIP Development Co. 192
In Jones, the Ohio Supreme Court applied the substantial certainty stan-
dard to three separate cases. In the first case, the. employees of the de-
fendant were injured when construction equipment they were using came
into contact with a high voltage electrical power line. The employees
averred that their employer, "knew, or should have known, that employ-
ees and other frequenters would be on the premises... and would be in
close proximity to high voltage electric lines ... [yet failed to] inspect,
and make safe the premises, nor to warn . .. of the high voltage...
lines."' 93 The court held that the complaint sufficiently alleged inten-
tional misconduct against the employer to allow the employees to pro-
ceed to trial.' 94 In the second case, the employee was killed while
operating a coal conveyor system that had been altered when the em-
ployer removed the safety cover. The plaintiff alleged that the employer
192. 472 N.E.2d 1046 (Ohio 1984). Ohio law also provides that an employer may become liable
in tort in spite of exclusivity bar if the injury arises out of a relationship other than the employer/
employee relationship. Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 361 N.E.2d 492 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976). The dual
capacity doctrine makes an employer vulnerable in tort if (s)he possesses a second persona com-
pletely independent from and unrelated to his status as an employer. 2A LARSON, supra note 17,
§ 72.80, at 14-220. In Mercer, a truck driver, injured by the blowout of his tire, sued and recovered
from is his employer in tort based on the fact that his employer had also manufactured the tire.
Mercer, 361 N.E.2d at 496. The doctrine in North Carolina dates back to the case of Tscheiller v.
Weaving Co., 199 S.E. 623 (N.C. 1938). In Pendergrass v. Child Care, Inc., 424 S.E.2d 391 (N.C.
1993), the plaintiff alleged that his employer was liable for removing safety guards because the em-
ployer was both manufacturer and designer of the machine. The court held that, because the altera-
tion of the machine was not a risk shared by the public, if there was a dual capacity doctrine, it did
not apply in this case. Pendergrass, 424 S.E.2d, at 394. See generally 2A LARSON, supra note 17,
§ 73.70 (discussing the problems with the dual capacity doctrine).
193. Jones, 472 N.E.2d at 1051-52.
194. Id. at 1052.
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"intentionally, maliciously, willfully and wantonly"' 95 removed the
safety cover and presented evidence that the employer knew that the
cover was intended to protect employees, but that no warnings were
.given to employees. The court found that this conduct could be charac-
terized as an intentional tort.196 In the third case, the employees alleged
that they were exposed to toxic chemicals which caused serious injuries,
and that their employer knew of the harmful exposure but misrepre-
sented the danger of such exposure to their health.' 97 The court held
that "[s]uch conduct certainly falls within the parameters of intentional
wrongdoing, particularly given the added feature of actively misrepre-
senting the degree of danger to employees, thereby prolonging their expo-
sure to the risk."' 198
The adoption of the substantial certainty doctrine in Jones had the
same effect on trial judges and attorneys in Ohio as Woodson is having in
North Carolina. Trial courts and attorneys simply wanted to know
"what facts, as pleaded, and as otherwise shown upon a motion for sum-
mary judgment... may overcome such a motion, and present a case with
intentional tort issues for the trier of the fact."' 99 The Ohio Supreme
Court attempted to answer the question of what constitutes an inten-
tional tort in the employer/employee setting in Van Fossen v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co. 2  The court held that in order to establish an intentional
tort under the substantial certainty standard the following must be
demonstrated:
(1) knowledge by the employer of the existence of a dangerous process,
procedure, instrumentality or condition within its business operation; (2)
knowledge by the employer that if the employees are required by virtue
of their employment to be subjected to such dangerous process, proce-
dure, instrumentality or condition, then harm to them would be a sub-
stantial certainty and not just a high risk; (3) that the employer, under
such circumstances, and with such knowledge, did act to so require the
employee to continue to perform his dangerous task.20'
The court felt the need to particularize the substantial certainty stan-
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1049. The employees told their supervisors about the problem but these complaints
were either ignored or ridiculed. The employees experienced rashes and respiratory problems that
the employer discovered were caused by acid fumes leaking into the fresh air system. The employer
closed off this portion of the plant but continued to tell the employees that the plant was safe. The
plant was eventually shut down and the employees were diagnosed with metal toxicity. Id.
198. Id. at 1053.
199. Fyffe v. Jeno's Inc., 570 N.E.2d 1108, 1111 (Ohio 1991).
200. 522 N.E.2d 489 (Ohio 1988); see also Kunkler v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 522 N.E.2d
477 (Ohio 1988); Pariseau v. Wedge Products, Inc., 522 N.E.2d 511 (Ohio 1988).
201. Van Fossen, 522 N.E.2d at 504. These guidelines were amended slightly in Fyffe v. Jeno's,
Inc., 570 N.E.2d 1108 (Ohio 1991). In Fyffe, the supreme court held that industrial activities that
involved a high risk of harm or a great risk of harm may reasonably encompass situations that fall
within the scope of an intentional tort. Fyffe, 570 N.E.2d at 1111.
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dard because "negligence actions [were being] filed and litigated as 'in-
tentional torts.' "202 In Van Fossen, for example, the plaintiff slipped and
fell backwards on a set of stairs that had been welded to the platform on
which he was working. The court affirmed the trial court's entry of sum-
mary judgment in favor of the employer.2"3 The Ohio Supreme Court
believed that these guidelines were sufficient to resolve the uncertainty
caused by Jones and to return the intentional tort exception to its proper
scope, with the result that workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy
for the vast majority of workplace injuries. 2" The analysis of the sub-
stantial certainty standard by the Ohio Supreme Court reveals that the
North Carolina courts are not alone in confusing reckless conduct with
conduct done with the knowledge that injury is substantially certain to
occur.
One re-occurring circumstance in the development of the substantial
certainty standard has been the consequence of an employer's removal of
safety guards.2 °5 In the codification of the substantial certainty stan-
dard,2° the Ohio legislature stated:
Deliberate removal by the employer of an equipment safety guard or
deliberate misrepresentation of a toxic or hazardous substance is evi-
dence, the presumption of which may be rebutted, of an act committed
with the intent to injure another if injury or an occupational disease or
condition occurs as a direct result. 20 7
The question raised by this section is how a court is to treat evidence
which tends to show that an employer intentionally removed a safety
device. The Ohio Supreme Court answered that a trial court is to treat
such evidence as just one part of the evidence presented for a summary
judgment motion and not as a rebuttable presumption of the intent of the
employer to commit an intentional tort.20 8
The elements listed by the Van Fossen court are intended to serve as a
202. Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 576 N.E.2d 722, 734 (Ohio 1991) (Moyer, C.J. and Holmes &
Wright J.J., dissenting).
203. Van Fossen, 522 N.E.2d at 505.
204. Brady, 576 N.E.2d at 734 (Brown, J., concurring). The court, in Brady v. Safety-Kleen
Corp., held that the legislature's codification of the substantial certainty standard in Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 4121.80 was unconstitutional. Id. at 729.
205. Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 472 N.E.2d 1046 (Ohio 1984); Fyffe v. Jeno's Inc., 570 N.E.2d 1108
(Ohio 1991). In Fyffe, the employer had removed a safety guard so that his employees could more
quickly clean out the conveyor. The plaintiff reached into the conveyor, as his supervisor had shown
him, and was injured. The court held that these facts presented a genuine issue of material fact of
whether the employer committed an intentional tort. Fyffe, 570 N.E.2d at 1114. See supra note 12
for proposed North Carolina legislation dealing with the removal of safety guards.
206. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80 (Anderson 1990).
207. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(G)(1) (Anderson 1990). Section 4121.80(G) could not
be retroactively applied because it concerned a substantive right. Van Fossen, 522 N.E.2d at 489.
Section 4121.80(G)(1) could not be retroactively applied. Kunkler v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
522 N.E.2d 477 (Ohio 1988).
208. Fyffe, 570 N.E.2d at 1112 (Ohio 1991).
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guideline for determining the existence of an intentional tort and as an
example of how intentional tort claims based on the substantial certainty
standard might be properly pled in North Carolina. An examination of
the complaints of one North Carolina law firm reveals a different plead-
ing method. 2 1 In the case of Scruggs v. Duke Power, 210 the plaintiffs,
employees of Duke Power, were exposed to asbestos and developed as-
bestosis. The complaint states:
12. Although one or more of the plaintiffs herein may have filed and/
or resolved their workers' compensation claims with the defendant, said
plaintiffs rely on the Supreme Court decision in Woodson v. Rowland...
in that said settlements do not bar their claims herein because an employ-
ers intentional tort will support a civil action. It is the plaintiffs' conten-
tion that Woodson, supra, allows plaintiffs to pursue simultaneously their
workers' compensation claims and civil actions as well without being re-
quired to elect between them.
13. The illnesses and disabilities of the plaintiffs are the direct and
proximate result of the intentional conduct, gross negligence, reckless-
ness and willfulness of the defendant in that, even though the defendant
knew that the asbestos... used in Duke's power plant [was] deleterious,
poisonous and harmful to plaintiffs' bodies, lungs, respiratory systems,
skin and health, the defendant failed in its duties to the plaintiffs in at
least the following ways: . . .211
This certainly seems adequate given the liberal pleading requirements 212
and the exclusion of state of mind from matters requiring special plead-
ing.2' 1 3 Based on the success of this attorney in handling Woodson
claims, it might be unwise to deviate from her example. In the case of
White v. Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., 214 the defendant forced its employees
to ride in a freight elevator, a violation of safety regulations, 215 knowing
that it was unsafe for passenger traffic. The elevator fell eighty feet with
no resistance while the plaintiffs were aboard. The complaint stated that
the defendant acted intentionally, willfully, wantonly, recklessly, and
with gross negligence, deliberately causing injuries which "were substan-
tially certain to follow the Defendant's malfeasance. ' 216 Unlike the pre-
vious complaint, this pleading uses the "substantial certainty" language.
209. The Salisbury law firm of Wallace and Whitley has been successful in handling Woodson
claims. See supra notes 170-171 and accompanying text for a discussion of this firm's successes.
210. No. 91 CVS 1471 (Rowan County Sup. Ct. Sept. 10, 1991).
211. Id. at 8-9.
212. N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-I Rule 8 (1991). Rule 8(a)(1) requires a "short plain statement of
the claim sufficiently particular to give the court and parties notice of the occurrences intended to be
proved showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id.
213. N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-I Rule 9 (1991). Rule 9(b) provides that "[r]alice, intent, knowl-
edge and other conditions of mind of a person may be averred generally." Id.
214. No. 91 CVS 1228 (Rowan County Super. Ct. July 26, 1991).
215. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-129 to 95-131 (1991).
216. White v. Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., No. 91 CVS 1228 (Rowan County Super. Ct. July 26,
1991).
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There is no requirement that this language must be used, but there is no
reason not to do so. 21 7
When considering whether to file a Woodson claim, an attorney should
look for the following: 1) a worker who has been seriously injured or
killed; 2) a prior injury or death occurring on the same equipment or
instrumentality; 3) the faulty operation of the equipment or instrumen-
tality, i.e., removal of safety guards or violation of safety regulations; 4)
prior warnings received by the employer from employees or safety in-
spectors; and 5) the ongoing use by the employer of the equipment or
instrumentality with the defect. A pleading should allege the existence of
the employment relationship, the facts demonstrating how the injury oc-
curred, the employer's misconduct, and the facts supporting the allega-
tion that the employer acted intentionally, including a statement that the
employer knew the misconduct was substantially certain to cause death
or serious injury.
With the Woodson decision, The North Carolina Supreme Court has
done more than "dip its toe into the treacherous waters" of willful and
wanton misconduct.2"' North Carolina may have adopted the substan-
tial certainty standard but North Carolina courts, like their predecessors
in Ohio, are holding that reckless conduct satisfies the substantial cer-
tainty standard. Professor Larson's position on the intentional tort ex-
ception is that nothing short of an act done with the specific intent to
injure is sufficient to overcome the exclusivity bar.219 Naturally, the in-
surance lobby and defense attorneys cite Professor Larson when they ar-
gue that the legislature should reverse Woodson. Professor Larson
attributes the expansion of the intentional tort exception to the misbegot-
ten marriage of tort law with workers' compensation law.220 Professor
Larson states:
Almost every major error that can be observed in the development of
compensation law, whether judicial or legislative, can be traced.., to the
importation of tort ideas....
Among common-law trained lawyers and judges ... the tort-connec-
tion fallacy has been most prevalent.... Failure to make a clean break
with tort thinking can be harmful to the employer as well as to the
employee. 22 1
217. Donnell "Trip" Van Noppen III, Stating a Woodson Claim Against the Employer After
Woodson v. Rowland, 24 J. N.C. ACAD. TRIAL LAW. 26 (1992).
218. 2A LARSON, supra note 17, § 68.15, at 13-58.
219. Id. § 68.13, at 13-10.
220. ARTHUR LARSON, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORN. L.Q.
206 (1952).
221. Id. at 207 (citations omitted). As an example, Larson believes that cases that hold an em-
ployer liable for the deliberate assault of a supervisory employee are incorrect because they apply the
nineteenth century concept of vice-principal liability. Id. See Daniels v. Swofford, 286 S.E.2d 582
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The validity of this argument rests on the historical genesis of workers'
compensation law as a quid pro quo wherein workers gave up their com-
mon law tort remedy in return for a swift no-fault remedy.2 22 Opponents
of Woodson argue that to restore tort liability would destroy the essence
of the trade-off and tear workers' compensation asunder.223 This argu-
ment is not without its merits, 224 but when one recalls that workers' com-
pensation law was enacted to eliminate the defenses of the fellow servant
rule, assumption of the risk, and contributory negligence, it is clear that
by relinquishing a common law remedy the employee did not give up
very much.225
In practice, can those that oppose Woodson possibly mean that before
an intentional tort in the workplace can be established, the employer
must be guilty of a criminal assault or murder? Those that advocate that
intentional torts can only be proven when the employer acts with the
specific intent to injure mean just that. Applying such a harsh rule
would preclude the workers at Imperial Food Products from recovering
anything except workers' compensation benefits. Even though criminal
law serves a different purpose than tort law and workers' compensation
law, there would seem to be much inequity in applying a less rigorous
standard in criminal proceedings than is necessary to overcome the ex-
clusive remedy doctrine.226 Employers should not be insulated from tort
(1982). It is, however, hard to see how applying tort concepts in workers' compensation cases could
be harmful to employees.
222. For a discussion of the historical development of workers' compensation laws, see supra
notes 15-45 and accompanying text.
223. 2A LARSON, supra note 17, § 68-15, at 13-65.
224. Opponents of expanded tort liability argue that if courts do not correctly apply the substan-
tial certainty standard, then courts will be faced with a proliferation of Woodson claims that are
nothing more than negligence actions, resulting in high settlements and jury verdicts. Employers
will no longer be subject to limited and predictable liability thus jeopardizing the continuing health
of business. David A. Mohler, Note, In the Wake of Mandolidis" A Case Study of Recent Trials
Brought Under the Mandolidis Theory-Courts are Grappling with Procedural Uncertainties and Juries
are Awarding Exorbitant Damages for Plaintiffs, 84 W. VA. L. REV. 893 (1982). Supporting this
argument is the increased cost, in terms of time and expense, to employers and insurers in litigating
tort claims. DECARLO & MINKOWITZ, supra note 15, at 218.
. 225. Jerry J. Phillips, The Relationship between the Tort System and Workers' Compensation -
the True Cost, 1981 CONF. ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION 88.
226. Involuntary manslaughter is the unintentional killing of another resulting from some act
done in a culpably negligent manner. State v. Lawson, 169 S.E.2d 265, 269 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969).
Culpable negligence arises from the "intentional, willful or wanton violation of a statute or ordi-
nance, designed for the protection of human life or limb." State v. Cope, 167 S.E.2d 456, 458 (N.C.
1933).
In Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co., 398 N.W.2d 882 (Mich. 1986), the court made just such an
argument in support of the adoption of the substantial certainty standard. The court cited People v.
O'Neil, 550 N.E.2d 1090 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) as an example of egregious employer misconduct that
would meet the substantial certainty standard but would not constitute a true intentional tort.
Beauchamp, 398 N.W.2d at 893. In O'Neil, the defendant employer used cyanide to recover silver
from film negatives. The employer was aware of the danger, the labels on the chemicals so indicated,
but the employer only hired non-English speaking employees. The employer did not provide safety
instructions or protective clothing. One worker died and others were severely injured due to cyanide
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liability for conduct that establishes criminal violations. The reluctance
to extend tort liability to reckless conduct by an employer is inconsistent
with the rationale used to support the conclusion that employees should
be liable in tort for willful, wanton, and reckless negligence. The supreme
court reasoned in Pleasant v. Johnson that "it would be a travesty of
justice and logic to permit a worker to injure a co-employee [through
reckless conduct], and then compel the injured co-employee to accept
moderate benefits under the Act. ' ' 227 If holding employees liable for will-
ful, wanton, and reckless negligence promotes workplace safety, then is
not this policy consideration better served by holding employers liable
for their reckless conduct, inasmuch as the consequences of employer
misconduct can be much broader and the resulting harm much greater
than in cases of employee misconduct?228
After the highest courts in Ohio and West Virginia expanded the in-
tentional tort exception to include employer misconduct which failed to
demonstrate a specific intent to injure, the legislatures in these states
passed statutes narrowing its scope. 229 These statutory schemes present
models that North Carolina legislators should consider when they ad-
dress Woodson. Most importantly, North Carolina legislators will have
to determine what level of employer misconduct is sufficient to overcome
the exclusivity bar. The Woodson court and the Ohio courts, while em-
ploying a substantial certainty standard, have in effect held that reckless
conduct is sufficient to overcome the exclusivity provisions. In opposi-
tion, Professor Larson would require a specific intent to injure. The deci-
sion confronting legislators brings into conflict the opposing interests of
workers and their employers. Will the legislators remember and con-
tinue to be motivated by the disaster at Hamlet, or will the interests of
big business succeed in convincing law makers that expanded liability
would cripple North Carolina economically? Let us hope that the
screams of Imperial Food Products employees continue to be heard.
The Ohio statute defined intentional tort as "an act committed with
the intent to injure another or committed with the belief that the injury is
substantially certain to occur" 230 and substantial certainty as "acts
poisoning. O'Neil, 550 N.E.2d at 1096. Larson states that these facts support a finding that the
employer acted with a specific intent to cause serious injury or death. 2A LARSON, supra note 17,
§ 68-15, at 13-63.
227. Pleasant v. Johnson, 325 S.E.2d 244, 250 (N.C. 1985). For a discussion of the Pleasant
decision, see supra text accompanying notes 102-112.
228. David M. Ledbetter, Note, Pleasant v. Johnson: The North Carolina Supreme Court Enters
the Twilight Zone-Is a Co-employee Liable in Tortfor Willful, Reckless, and Wanton Conduct? 64
N.C. L. REV. 688 (1986).
229. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80 (Anderson 1990); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (1985). In
Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978), West Virginia extended the inten-
tional tort exception to include the willful, wanton and reckless conduct of an employer.
230. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(G)(1) (Anderson 1990).
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[done] with deliberate intent to cause an employee to suffer injury, dis-
ease, condition, or death."2 a Although Ohio law makers used the sub-
stantial certainty language, it is clear that Ohio chose to include only acts
done with the specific intent to cause injury.23 2 The Ohio statute in-
cluded a section limiting the court's duties to determining whether the
employer committed an intentional tort and placing the determination of
the amount of damages with the Industrial Commission.233 Damages in
this section could be no less than fifty percent or no more than three
times the total amount of workers' compensation, with an overall ceiling
on damages of one million dollars. 234 However, the Ohio Supreme Court
has held this statute void as an improper exercise of legislative power.2 35
Even though the Ohio statutory scheme appears to be a model of what
North Carolina should not do, Ohio lawmakers may have provided
North Carolina legislators with one provision worthy of duplication.
Ohio created an intentional tort fund into which all employers paid a
fixed sum and from which injured employees could be compensated for
injuries caused by the intentional acts of their employers.2 36
In 1983, West Virginia enacted a statute that provided employees with
a right to pursue a civil action against employers who act with a con-
scious, subjectively and deliberately formed intention to produce the spe-
cific result of injury or death.2 37  Deliberate intention can also be
satisfied, if the employee can establish all the following facts:
(A) That a specific unsafe working condition existed in the workplace
which presented a high degree of risk and a strong probability of serious
injury or death;
(B) That the employer had a subjective realization and an appreciation
of the existence of such specific unsafe working condition and of the high
degree of risk and the strong probability of serious injury or death
presented by such specific unsafe working condition;
(C) That such specific unsafe working condition was a violation of a
231. Id.
232. Section 4121.80(A) included a retroactive one-year statute of limitations, applicable to
pending actions, which was found to be unconstitutional because it obliterated an employee's sub-
stantive right under Jones v. VIP Dev., Co., 472 N.E.2d 1046 (Ohio 1984) which was governed by a
two-year statute of limitations. Section 4121.80(G) was held to impose a more stringent standard
than that adopted in Jones v. VIP Dev., Co., 472 N.E.2d 1046 (Ohio 1984) and because this new
standard constituted a denial of substantive rights based on its retroactive application to pending
cases, this section could not be retroactively applied. Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 522
N.E.2d 489, 498 (Ohio 1988).
233. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(D) (Anderson 1990).
234. Id.
235. Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 576 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio 1991) (Douglas & Brown, JJ., concur-
ring. Moyer, C.J., Holmes & Wright, JJ., dissenting). Justice Brown believed that the damage cap
violated the right to equal protection and that the provision that the Industrial Commission deter-
mine the amount of damages violated the right to trial by jury. Id. at 733.
236. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(E) (Anderson 1990).
237. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(2)(i) (1985).
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state or federal safety statute, rule or regulation, whether cited or not, or
of a commonly accepted and well-known safety standard within the in-
dustry or business of such employer, which statute, rule, regulation or
standard was specifically applicable to the particular work and working
condition involved, as contrasted with a statute, rule, regulation or stan-
dard generally requiring safe workplaces, equipment or working
conditions;
(D) That notwithstanding the existence of the facts set forth in subpara-
graphs (A) through (C) hereof, such employer nevertheless thereafter ex-
posed an employee to such specific unsafe working condition
intentionally; and
(E) That such employee so exposed suffered serious injury or death as a
direct and proximate result of such specific unsafe working condition.238
West Virginia lawmakers decided that employers should be liable for
more than criminal assaults and murders. For this they should be com-
mended, but more worthy of praise is their acknowledgment that the
substantial certainty standard, as defined by the Restatement, is too nar-
row to provide sufficient protection for workers. The term "substantial
certainty" is absent from the statute. The West Virginia statute is a codi-
fication of the willful, wanton, and reckless standard similar to the rule
enunciated by the Van Fossen court. The Woodson court and the Ohio
courts defined intent using the substantial certainty standard, but the
standard actually applied required evidence establishing less than knowl-
edge to a substantial certainty. One explanation for this inconsistency is
the failure of these courts to sufficiently distinguish reckless conduct
from intentional conduct. Another explanation is that these courts were
struggling to expand tort liability within an exception for intentional
torts. Based on this explanation, these decisions can be viewed as an
attempt by the courts to refrain from engaging in judicial legislation.239
The courts recognized the need to protect workers from the reckless con-
duct of their employers but were limited by the intentional tort exception
and the Restatement definition of intent. It is understandable that courts
seeking to expand the intentional tort exception would look to the Re-
statement definition of intent, but decisions addressing workers' safety
need not fit nicely into that scholarly definition of intent. The develop-
ment of workers' compensation law as a unique remedy for employees
supports this statement. Workplace safety demands more flexibility than
the Restatement can provide and this fact was recognized in the law an-
238. W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(2)(ii) (1985). An employee is prohibited from receiving punitive
damages and the court is encouraged to dismiss the action if the plaintiff fails to prove one of the
elements listed in (A) through (E). W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(2)(iii) (1985). West Virginia lawmakers
established an intentional tort fund called the Employers' Excess Liability Fund which pays the
excess of damages over the amount of workers' compensation. W. VA. CODE § 23- 4C- 1 to § 23- 4C-
3 (1985).
239. Deese v. Southern Lawn & Tree Expert Co., 293 S.E.2d 140 (N.C. 1982), reh'g denied, 303
S.E.2d 83 (N.C. 1982).
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nounced by West Virginia legislators and the Van Fossen court. Apply-
ing either the West Virginia statute or the Van Fossen guidelines, the
plaintiff in Woodson and the workers at the Imperial Food Products
plant would be able to overcome the exclusivity provisions of the Act.
North Carolina lawmakers need to remember more than the screams
of the workers and the twenty-five deaths at the Imperial Food Products
plant. They need to remember that between 1978 and 1984, 1233 work-
ers were killed on the job in North Carolina, an average of 176 each
year. 2 ' They need to remember that in 1988 there were 207,132 work-
related injuries and/or illnesses in the private sector and another 19,185
in the public sector - eight percent of the North Carolina work force.24'
More workers die each year in North Carolina than United States
soldiers died in the Persian Gulf War.24 2 Knowing these statistics, one
realizes that the worker safety bills passed by the North Carolina Gen-
eral Assembly in 1991 were not an overreaction to the disaster at Ham-
let. 243  The North Carolina General Assembly should continue to
provide financial incentives for employers to have safe workplaces and to
accomplish this end, North Carolina legislators should permit injured
workers and surviving families with a cause of action for the willful, wan-
ton, and reckless conduct of their employers.
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